Southern Business Review
Volume 6

Issue 1

Article 3

April 1980

Efficient Markets and Underwriting Performance in Small Stock
Offerings
Robert J. Angell
East Carolina University

Jerry G. Hunt
East Carolina University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/sbr
Part of the Business Commons, and the Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Angell, Robert J. and Hunt, Jerry G. (1980) "Efficient Markets and Underwriting Performance in Small
Stock Offerings," Southern Business Review: Vol. 6: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/sbr/vol6/iss1/3

This article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Southern Business Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@georgiasouthern.edu.

EFFICIENT MARKETS AND
UNDERWRITING PERFORMANCE
IN SMALL STOCK OFFERINGS
Robert J. Anl(ell and Jerry G. Hunt
I NTRODUCTION

It is widely alledged that underwriters are capable of successlully pricing new stock issues such that offerings will be quickly subscribed and
distributed to the benefit of both the firm and the underwriting syndicate. For both to benefit, it is necessary that prices are set low enough
for the issue to be marketed readll)- and high enough for the issuing firm
to obtain approximately the market value. For thi, to occur ll stands to
reason that initial subscribers should not be able to earn large excess
returns, ,.e., returns substantially greater than returns a"ailable in the
market
Numerous studies have addressed underpricing and related issues arising from sale of new common stock. For example, J G. 'l.1cDonald and
A. K. Fisher [ 1972) have shown that pricing is such that initial
subscribers frequently earn large returns, but subsequent investors were
unable to earn excess returns Roger C Ibbotson and Jeffre:, I- Jaffe
(1975), in an analy,is of the "hot issues" market, demonstrated that excess return residuals were serially correlated. That wch results are possible may be sufficient explanation for the oversubscription of man:,
unseasoned or new issues, permiuing the brokers (\\ ho ma:, also be
underwriters) to ration the nc,,., shares ol stock. The studies mentioned
abo\e anal:,1e the in1t1al offerings, those of a company going public tor
the first time Other studies demonstrate sign1licant umlerpricing in the
ne\\ issues market. Denms Logue (1973), as well as Ibbotson and Jafle,
Y.a, able to detect ,igmficant underpricing. Ho,,.,c,er, he .... as unable to
explain why a monopsomstic indu,try such a, m,estmcnt banking \,ould
use undcrpricmg on a contmuous basis. The,e studies arc also supported
by the \\Ork ot f-rank K Reill, and Kenneth Hatlield [1969) and b)Re11ly's I urthcr rc,earch [ I 97 3, 1977) .
A relauvel} limned amount ot re,ear..h has been undertaken regarding
underpricmg on stock iswes other than in1110/ issues. The most notable
of these 1s the analvs1s ol ,econdan distributions b, l\hron 'cholc,
[191 2) In h1, rescarc.h, Scholc, lound li11lc 1I an)- C\1dincc ~t sigmlicant
underpricing, a result contran to most pre, 1ou, work, including that by
John Lintner (1962).
This paper addresses underpricmg and related topics reg,1rdmg !\sues
of nc" common stock b:, firms which ha\'e pre,1ously tapped the public
equ11y markets. incc the pre\lously ment1011cd studies, a, \,ell as others
a\'a1lable m the literature, arc primarily concerned with 1m11al offering~
of common \tock, the bulk of the analv>1\ ha\ been on stock which 1,
traded in the Over-the-Counter market ,,., hen the after market I\
established. A relevant and related question concerns the performance ol
s.uch stock offerings compared with other new oflerings for firms already
listed on the ew York Stock Exchange ( YSE) or the American tock
Exchange (AMEX) or already tradmg OTC with quotes available via
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ASDAQ. Once established firms are admitted, the picture changes·
~hat large, ~in_ancially stro~g firm~ w_ould b_e expected to have more ab!~
1~y ~r bargain~ng st:ength in nego~1at1ons with underwriters than smaller,
nsk1er, and financially weaker firms. That is not to say that all small
fi~~s are financ_ially _weak_, but generally firms capable of raising $100
m1lhon or more in a single issue of common stock would quali fy as financially stronger than the typical OTC or AMEX firm raising $10 million.
The SEC and Federal Reserve System use $15 million as a barrier for
small and unreported offerings for corporate firms. A recent study by
Sidney M. Robbins et al. [1979) used $10 million as a measure of small
stock issues. This study used $25 million as an upper limit to include
small and medium-sized offerings in order to insure that NYSE firms
would be included in the sample.
MODELS, A SUMPTIONS, A D HYPOTHESES

This study was concerned with the question of whether or not significant differences exist in the price performance of new common stock
issues on the NYSE, AMEX, and OTC. Specifically, the study covers
initial pricing practices and subsequent rates of return available for investors in new issues as a function of the trading status of the stock, i.e.
YSE, AMEX, or OTC. Hence, the fir t hypothesis addresses the question of whether or not there is a difference in the offering price discount
(commonly known as underpricing) among the three trading statuses
given above. Conventional wisdom, previous research, and casual logical
empiricism would indicate that the larger, YSE-listed issues would
demonstrate smaller offering discounts, and hence, "more efficient"
pricing patterns. More simply, the offering prices for NYSE-listed issues
would more closely approximate the last price before the offering than
would be true for AMEX and OTC issues. Employing a definition of the
jth discount given by
DISC0j

= PI Bj - POFj

(I)

where PI BJ is the last pnce before the offering date, POFj 1s the ~e_t offering price to the public, and DISC0j is the discount (underpncmg),
then the null hypothesis is DISC0j = 0.
.
For explanatory variable interactions, it was necessary to redefine the
discount to account for transaction fees. Therefore, the following form
was developed for use in the subsequent models:
DISClj

=

B(PIBj)-POFj

(la)

where B is unity plus some brokerage fee, e.g., B = I + b, where bis
usually about 2-2.50Jo. The model was tested with the relationship
D ISC lj

= f(TS.,

PB30j, PA30j, S IZEj, NS H ARj)

(2)

where TSi refers to the ith trading status, P B30 refers to the price 30 days
before offering, PA30 refers to the pr ice 30 d ays after offering, SIZE
refers to the dollar volume of the offering, and NS HAR represents the
number of shares issued by the offering. T he intercorrelations of these
variables were not significant.
The secondary relationship to be investigated concerns the perfor~ance of the underwriters in pricing the new offering relat ive to the price
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performa nce for the subsequent 30-day and 90-day periods. T he relevant
comparisons a re made using rates of return (single-period returns), since
investors in new issues of common stock apparently expect above
average returns (excess returns). Here is where the problem of efficiency
of pricing is apparent, since the pricing should be high enough (or
"fair") to the issuing firm so that large excess returns relative to risk are
not earned. Yet , the price must be sufficiently low or attractive so that investors will choose to purchase the shares. Presumably this implies
positive excess returns.
According to the most relevant studies, including the Reilly I1969,
1973) and Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975], the first month after offering is the
critical time for new issues. However, it may be that more efficient pricing occurs during less ebullient market periods. This is somewhat counter
10 most conventional views. Ibbotson and Jaffe found that the month
following a period of low cumulative residual returns may be better for
minimizing the total premmms that develop on new stock issues. This
means that if investors earn lower premiums the initial offering price
must have been more efficiently set. Hence, the time period selected
should permit adequate testing of the hypothesis without undue bias
from either boom or bust markets. For this study, the 11me period covers
approximately sixteen months (from September 1977 10 December 1978)
during which the maJor market indices both rose and declined.
The premium that docs or does not develop on the individual stock
issues is the critical variable of interest and is measured as a rate of
return. First, rates of return for the 30-day and 90-day periods after offering were com puted as follows:
(3)

where PA 1j represents the price of the jlh new issue 30 or 90 days after
offering date, Rkj represents the rate of return of the jlh ne" issue for
the kth period, and POFj , as defined m (1), represents the net offering
price to the public.
Second, annualized continuously com pounded rates of return for both
periods \\ere computed using the relationship

(4)
where T represents the ratio of a year tot, 360/ t, EXP is the Exponential
Funct ion, and ARkJ represents the annualized rate of return of the same
issue and period.
Finally, market adJusted exce s returns "ere computed for the same
two periods for each stock issue. The exces returns were computed using
a risk and return framework following the market model. That model
implies use of an adjustment on the relevant index as follows:
(5)

where ERkj represents the excess return for the jlh new issue, during the
kth per(od, RINDkj is the a nnualized return on t he relevant index for the
k th period, a nd /Jj is the mar ket sensitivity parameter for the jth issue as
com puted by Merrill Lynch [ I 978]. T he relevant index is either the New
York Stock Exchange Index for NYSE fi rms , or the American Stock Exchange Index for AM EX fi rms, o r the Nationa l Association o f Securities
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Dealers Automatic Quotation Index for OTC firms. The returns we
. d
·
re annua I1ze an? contmuously compounded as done for the stock issues for
the two penods.
Ther~ a_re s~ve~al variables that might be used in an a ttempt to explain
the vanat1on m either the rates of return or the excess returns. Followin
the l~ad of Logue [ 1973), we focused on the size of the issue, the value 0~
the issue, and the trading status of the issue, i.e. NYSE, AMEX or
OTC. Naturally, the trading status variables were categorical, and h;nce
were represented in the regression models by dummy (0, I) variables.
Although size and value may be imperfect measures of the expected
liquidity in the aftermarket, it appeared that their omission would be a
misspecification of the model that we proposed to use. As an expectational variable from the penod pnor to the offering data, we included the
percentage price change from thirty days pnor to the offering date itself.
Hence. it was simi lar to a nonnormalized rate of return for the prior
period.
Therefore, tests of the second hypothesis might be made using models
of returns as explained above. The modeb of annualized returns would
be based on the formulation
ARkj

=

f(TS1, EPCJ, SIZEj, NSHARj, RINDkj),

(6)

where TSi refers to the ith trading status and is a categorical variable,
EPC represents an expected pnce change prior to the offering and was
measured by either the actual price change or by a price thirty days
before offering, SIZE is the value of the offering 111 dollars, and SHAR
is the number of shares. As noted previously, RINDkj is the return on
the relevant index for the N-day time period.
The models for the excess returns were similar to (6) and given by
ERkj

=

f(TSi, SIZE, NSHAR, EPC, RINDkj),

(7)

where the variables are defined as above. One difference was that the
SIZE and SHAR variables were used in logarithm form.
A sample of 104 common stock offering episodes was selected over the
sixteen month time period. Neither secondary offermgs nor issues with a
total value of greater than $25 million were included. The mean value
was approximately $11.2 million, the average number of shares was
626,000, and the unweighted mean of the offering price was $18.66.
Prices were obtamed for the stoc k 30 days prior to offering (last traded
price), the close of the day immediately prior to offering, 30 days aft~r
offering, and 90 days after offering. For OTC stocks an average of bid
and asked pnces was taken as a proxy for the last traded price. The sam·
pie data were drawn from various issues of The Wall Street Journal.
However, the decision to use the beta-based market adjustment reduced
the sample to 86 issues for the analysis of the excess returns.

ESTIMATION RESULTS AND ANA LYSIS
Results of multivariate analysis are included in this section. ~s a
preliminary to the estimation of the regression models and analysis of
covariance, t he discounts using the relationsh ip (l) to determine DISC~j
were computed and summarized as given in Table 1. A cursory analysis
of these data discloses t hat there were m o re positive discounts for OTC
4
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than AMEX or NYSE, which is as expected. Recall that DISC0j was the
unadjusted discount of the offering price from the last previous market
price. If the discounts using the brokerage-adjusted model (DISC! j) had
been used, the number of negative discounts would have been reduced to
only four. Two remained for OTC issues and two remained for NYSE
issues, implying no obvious pattern. However, analysis of variance of the
frequencies by trading statm failed to demo nstrate any significant differences among the variables. The computed F value with (2,6)d. f. was
0.74.
TABLE I
fREQU£1'CIES AM> PERCFNTA(,t,!, Of PO',ITl\,t , ,H,ATIH., A ,o Lf.RO D1',COU'ITS BY TRADl"-G STATU',. fOR "IEW !-!TOCK OHFRl",GS, lJ",ADJUSHD
OHERl",G PRICtS
freq ue ncwe,

on
Po~11ive

AMtX

'-\",E

TOrALS

45

33
4

11

14

31

Negau,e

II

.!

16

28

TOTAL S

48

19

11

i04

Zero

PercentaRe'
OTC

AMtX

" ' ">t

TOIALS

Po,iti, e

7J l3

I I II

15 56

100.00

Zero

12 90

41 94

J~

16

10000

W 2'l

·' q

q _14

100.00

PercentaRC\

ore
Zero

, cgau,c

AMI.JI.

,,..,,
18 92

68 .'5

!6 '\:!

8 33

6b 4 2

17 84

n .92

5 26

41.24

100.00

100.00

100.00

Source, Darn ,ampk and l\lodel ( I l rc,uh, .

Table 2 p rovides the results of estimating \'artous form ~ of the model
relating the disco unt to the trading statu~ variable~. the liquidit}
variables, and the expected price variables. It can be seen that there are
rwo reported ver~1ons of the discount , a nd these result fro m modifications introduced by use of the relationship~ gl\ en by 18 and IC. One
notable result is that almosr none of the trading statu~ dummie is significant. The only exceptions occurred for the intercept term ( = YSE) in
trial models not included here. The SIZE variable is significant and of
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the correct sign. The expectational variable PB30 is also significant. All
of the R' values are low, but the F values are significant. The most probable explanation for this is that there 1s some statistically significant relationship, but the relationship is quite weak. In particular, there is insuffi.
cient evidence to demonstrate that underpricing is a function of the
trading status .
Table 3 presents the results of the estimation efforts for the models
relating the annualized excess returns to the various explanatory
variables as given by relationships (6) and (7). In the results of these
estimations, one could impute "true efficiency." "True efficiency" as
defined by the inability of investors to earn significant annualized excess
returns is demonstrated with most R' values of less than ten percent.
Such low values were obtained from the best versions of the models, and
they illustrate ho'w close to insignificance the annualized returns and excess return s may be. Other ver\1ons of the models using annual returns
instead of market adjusted returns gave similar returns wnh some slightly
higher R' values. (These results are available from the authors.)

TABL • 2

OfH. Rl,C OISCQL 'l; T '100lLS "1TH ADJLSH O \1ARKFT PRICE
Olf FER•, TIAL~
MOD•L IA
O1!,C0

Explana1or}
Variables

\1OOU 1B
O1',CI

MODEL IC
DI Cl

lntercep1

0.04915
(0.220)

0.22814
(0 99)

0.15223
(0.61)

OTC

0.03227
(0.27)

001818
(0 15

0.01576
(0. 13)

- 0.12402
( 0.89)

0 12048
(· 0.85)

0.13850
(· 0 96)

0.00004
2 38) "

0.00003
(· I 75)'

0.00004
(· I 92)'

'-ISHAR

0.00039
(I 39)

0.00022
(0 79)

(106)

PB30

0.01930
( 1.82)'

0 .02977
(2 77)' "

0.02472
(1.99)"

A"1E:X
SIZL

0.01110
(0.81)

PA30
10.092°'0

R'
F VALUES

D-W
1-values in parenthese,
• s1gn1ficant a1
" s1gnifican1 a1

•• •significant at

6

0.00033

< 10"'•
< 5"'•
<

111/o

13 .541°'0

14 124"'•

2.20'

3.07 "

2.66"

I 954

I 939

I 938

....

TABU 3
PARAMETER ESTIMATES Ot f XCE'>!> Rt TUR' '1100EL FOR 30-0AY
G OAH..'>
A D 90-0A Y P ERIOD AFTER Nt.\\' COMMO" STOCK Off ERi

---

MODE L 2A
ERi

Explanator)
VariabltS

2 2 394
(0.05)

Intercept

0.69570
(· o. 10)

OTC
AMEX

12.84523
(l 50)

SIZE (LOG)

0 53970
(0.08)

NSHAR (LOG)

0.86 141
( 0 11)

EPC

0.2831~
(· 0.08)

MODEL 28
t, RI

MODEL lC
t.Rl

5 .45782

S.33896
(l.63)

(· l 95)'

• 1.0249'

0.9i858
(· l 86)'

19.0~475
(2.23)"

· 0.61611
(· 1.03)

0 H66"
(· 0 88)

0.6"221
(0.09)

(

.41991
0.18)
0.513B
0.07)

0 11924
(009)
0.064"6
(· 0.02)

9 85647
(2. 58)' •'

RI DI

F VALUES
D-\\
t-,aluc,

in

15 563"'•
2.4 3•
2 302

(l 67)'

o.~96~o
l 74)'
0 602 0

7.882"'•
1.37
2.136

- 0.94202

(· l 82)'

0 6 466
16)

(l 02)

(l

0 06 48
(0.25)

0 0'231
(02"1

0.68289
(122)

RIND2
R'

MODEL 2D
ERl

8 050"'•
l I~

2 261

tuos•·•
1.08
!. 196

parcnthc,c,

' '1gnih,ant at , 10"'•
• •\1gmhcant at < 5ro
•• •1.ii@mficant at < l "'•

Further examinauon of the excess returns for 1he 1~0 period,
elaborates the major findings. Herc, R' values are much lo\,er than those
for the be'>t model in Table 2 The results for the '.\0-da), e,cess return,
were at least \lgnificant in one model u,ing the return on the indc,
variable, but the re<,u\ts for the 90-da), excess return, neither gave qgnificant F values nor explained much . The R' ,alues ~ere about ,e,en percent. In fact, in Modeh 2C and 20 (covering the 90-day period), fe\\
variables including the coefficient for the return on the inde, ~ere
significant. For the 30-day period, 1odels 2A and 28 indicate
significance for the coefficients of the RI DI and 'S HAR (number of
shares) variables, and yet the values for R' ol 15.563 and 7 .882 are not
sausfactory levels 10 explain any1hing, despite the F \ alue of 2.43 in
Model 2A.
UMMARV A D CO CL

10

This paper has attempted to determine whether or not significant differences exist in the price performance, and hence rates of return, among
7

new common stock issues on the NYSE , AMEX, and OTC. The initial
response of many, i.e. the NYSE demonstrates "fairer" or more efficient pricing patterns, has not been sustained by the statist ical results.
Although there were more positive discounts of the offering price from
the last prior price for OTC-traded stocks, there was so much variation
for each trading status that the null hypothesis of no difference in the
NYSE, AMEX, and OTC could not be rejected, even at a fifty percent
level.
The secondary hypothesis was more difficult 10 assess. The basic approach was estimating annualized excess returns over both 30-day
periods and 90-day periods following issue data. The statistical
significance of the parameter estimates and models were mixed. The explanatory power of the models was poor, with values of R' ranging from
about 15 percent down to six percent. None of the versions of the models
was significant at a reasonable level of significance. The trading status
dummies for OTC, AM EX, and NYSE were usually not significant. The
liquidity and/or marketability variables (SIZE, NSHAR) were significant in some models, but not m any consistent fashion. The expectau onal variable (EPC) was never signi ficant. The 30-day return on the index (RIND! ) was significant but not the 90-day version , RIND2.
A reasonable interpretation of the results of this paper would be that
the previous research indicating pos111ve returns for the first 30-day
period after offering date may be defended, since the explanatory power
of the best model for that period was superior to the similar model for
the 90-day period. Yet. with such weak and mi xed results, one must question even the positive 30-day ret urns based o n the fact that they were so
inconsistent and weak.
A further statistical demonstration of the relative efficiency has clearly
been provided by the results of 1h1s research . A question as yet
unanswered 1s cenaml) relevant: what has been the 1mpac1 of changes in
the seventies on the results of this research? Since the data set consisted
of the most recent data available, and after May Day a nd other unbundling o f activities of brokers and underwnters, could the new environment and current data account fo r the greater efficiency of security pricmg implied by the results here? It should be recalled that the results include data up to December 1978, a nd most changes seem to increase efficiency of pricing.
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